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Abstract The ﬁrst order approach to solving the standard one-dimensional
principal-agent model is conditional upon the relevant stochastic production
function obeying two noteworthy restrictions: that the Likelihood Ratio be
monotonically increasing in output, and that the distribution function be con-
vex in eﬀort. It is usually claimed that such conditions are very restrictive,
as very few of the standard probability distributions satisfy both properties.
The purpose of this note is to show that this lack of generality should not
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11 Introduction
It is well known that the ﬁrst order approach to solving the standard one-
dimensional principal-agent model is conditional upon the relevant stochas-
tic production function obeying two noteworthy restrictions: the Monotone
Likelihood Ratio Property and that the distribution function be convex in
eﬀort. It is usually claimed that such conditions are very restrictive, as very
few of the standard probability distributions — like the Normal, Beta, Chi
square, F, Weibull, etc. — satisfy both properties (e.g., Jewitt, 1988; Li Calzi
and Spaeter, 2003).
The purpose of this note is to show that this lack of generality should not
be seen as a problem, since some simple convexifying transformations are
available, that enable one to work with suitably transformed standard distri-
butions, in such a way that some key properties (e.g., unimodality or sym-
metry) are preserved consistently with those required for contract-theoretic
modeling.
2 The basic model
The standard formulation of the continuous principal-agent model with sep-


















u(w(x))f(x,a)dx − c(a) (1.c)
where x denotes output and a eﬀort; v(·) is the principal’s payoﬀ, and u(·)−
c(a) the agent’s, with c(a) increasing convex and w(·) the payment schedule
from the principal to the agent; u denotes the agent’s reservation utility,
and it is usually assumed that both u and v are increasing concave functions.
1Non separable utility is much harder to work with. An extension of the FOA to the
nonseparable utility case is provided by Alvi (1997).
2Letting subscripts denote derivatives, f(x,a) = Fx(x,a) denotes the strictly
positive density of
F : X × A → [0,1]
which gives the parametrized distribution F(x,a) of observable (and veri-
ﬁable) output x ∈ X, given the agent’s hidden action a ∈ A⊂ R+. It is
standardly assumed that the support X is a compact interval independent
of a; that F is continuously diﬀerentiable at least twice; and that the agent’s
eﬀort exerts a positive eﬀect on output in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic
dominance, that is
Fa(x,a) ≤ 0 (2)
for all a ∈ A.2
Problem (1) embodies the idea of the principal maximizing her utility sub-
ject to the agent’s participation constraint (1.b) — whereby he gains at least
his reservation utility; and the agent’s incentive compatibility constraint (1.c)
— whereby his (unobservable) chosen action is consistent with the principal’s
objective.
Problem (1) is in general very diﬃcult to solve, so that following Mirrlees
(1975) the so-called First Order Approach (FOA) is usually invoked:3 that




∗)dx − ca (a
∗) = 0 (3)
i.e., by the requirement that a∗ be the a stationary point of the agent’s
expected utility.4 Subsequent literature (Holmström,1979; Rogerson, 1985)
established that the FOA, though not valid in general, it is so if the following
twin conditions are satisﬁed
Faa(x,a) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X (4.a)
αx (x,a) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X (4.b)
2The set A is sometimes assumed to be an open interval, so as to characterize optima
by interior maxima (e.g., Jewitt, 1988, p.1179)
3An important complementary approach is provided by Grossman and Hart (1983).
4A generalized Lagrangean approach to the FOA that includes multipliers for second
order conditions is provided by Araujo and Moreira (2001).
3Condition (4.a) is usually known as the CDF property (eﬀort-convexity of
the distribution function), while (4.b) is known as the MRLP (Monotone




is the likelihood ratio, assumed to be monotonically increasing in x.
While the MRLP is generally looked at as a non-controversial assump-
tion, the CDF property is usually considered very much restrictive. Indeed,
though one reasonable implication of the CDF property is that of decreas-
ing marginal (expected) productivity of eﬀort,5 very few distributions seem
to share this property, a property which moreover does have one disturbing
feature highlighted by Jewitt (1988, p.1177):
[consider the case where o]utput is subject to a simple additive disturbance ε with
distribution function F, and eﬀort, a, is measured in output terms. So, realized
output is given by x = a+ε, and this has distribution function F(x−a) which is
only convex in eﬀort if ε has an increasing density! Hence, an apparently natural
case does not ﬁt the condition.
3 Two simple convexifying transformations
The question we ask is whether there exist convexifying mappings which may
transform some given distribution into one satisfying the properties required
by the FOA, viz the MRLP and the CDF property, while retaining some
features (like unimodality and symmetry) which make sense in a variety of
environments.6
Generally speaking, the issue of generating distributions by appropriate
transformations is addressed by the statistical literature within the frame-
work of distribution systems (e.g., Johnson et al.,1994, ch.12), which may
5Since expected output is µ(a) = 1−
￿
X F(x,a)dx, µaa(a) < 0 follows from Faa(x,a) ≥
0 for all x.
6In this sense our approach is somehow complementary to that of Li Calzi and Spaeter
(2003), who develop general formulations for classes of densities satisfying the MRL and
the CDF properties, such that " these classes are generic and encompass a large number
of speciﬁc functional forms." (p.168).
4also be relevant to the problem at hand. For example, the so called S-system









with γ > 0 and b < c. This family includes the logistic distribution (b = 1,
c = 2), which can be shown to obey both the MLR and the CDF properties
for an appropriate parameter choice.7
In this note, however, we shall focus on two more speciﬁc convex trans-
formations which in principle are meant to be applicable to any distribution.
3.1 Case 1
This case relies on the idea of appropriately parametrizing some "core" out-
put distribution G(x) : X → [0,1]. If one lets ϕ : [0,1]×A→ [0,1], any given
a induces a distribution F such that F : X × A → [0,1]:
F(x,a) = ϕ(G(x),a)
It is then just a matter of simple diﬀerentiation to prove the following:
Proposition 1 Let ϕ have the following properties for all x ∈ X and a ∈ A:
(i) ϕ(0,a) = 0, ϕ(1,a) = 1; (ii) ϕ1(·,a) ≥ 0; (iii) ∂
∂x
ϕ12
ϕ1 ≥ 0; (iv) ϕ22 ≥ 0.
Then F is a distribution obeying both the MRLP and the CDF property.
We present two examples:
Example 1 One example which arises quite naturally is the power function.
Take any distribution G : X→ [0,1], in principle satisfying neither CDF nor
MRLP: then if one deﬁnes F(x,a) = G(x)a, F is a proper distribution for any
a > 0, which does satisfy both the CDF property and the MRLP. Indeed, it





where a is the mean
and s a dispersion parameter (Johnson et al., 1995, p.115). By normalizing the support
as X =[0,1], one obtains one f(x,a;s): e.g., for s = 2 this has the required properties for
any a > 1.
5is readily seen that Faa(x,a) = G(x)a ln
2 G(x) > 0 for all x, while the density





a + lnG(x) (6)
which is obviously increasing in x. As an instance, when the "core" distri-






which is symmetric and unimodal for any positive a.
Example 2 Another example is given by the following transformation. Take






for A = (1,∞). One can check that Faa(x,a) is positive for all x ∈ X and










(ae − 1)(1 + lna)
￿
which is clearly monotonically increasing in x.8
3.2 Case 2
A somewhat diﬀerent approach relies on applying a suitable transformation
to the distribution’s support. Let the distribution H : Y → [0,1], and let
ψ : X × A → Y so that any given a induces a distribution F : X × A → [0,1]
such that
F(x,a) = H (ψ(x,a))
Then the following can be easily established:
8In this connection one should perhaps mention a third example, where F(x,a) =
[exp{G(x)a} − 1]/(e − 1), which gives the same F as deﬁnition (7) for a = 1, and can be
seen as a transformation Example 1. One can easily check that also in this case Faa(x,a)
is positive and the likelihood ratio is increasing.
6Proposition 2 Let ψ(x,a) and h(ψ) = Hψ (ψ) have the following properties













a + ψaa > 0. Then F is a distribution obeying both the MRLP
and the CDF property.
Again we consider here two examples, the presentation of which is simpli-
ﬁed by characterizing densities via their Esteban elasticity:9 for any generic
















where µ is the distribution mean.
Example 3 A natural case in point is the well known Jewitt formulation,
where ψ(x,a) = x − a : which however — as Jewitt (1988) emphasizes —
is consistent with both the required properties only at the cost of f being
an increasing density. Arguably, however, the additive structure is somehow
conditional on the chosen units.10 Suppose then that ψ (x,a) = ex−a:11 it is
readily seen that α(x,a) = −πh(ψ) (so that the MLRP is satisﬁed if πh (·) is
monotonically decreasing), and that the CDF property requires πh (ψ) > 0.
Hence, both properties are satisﬁed by all H such that πh is positive and
decreasing, which holds for a variety distributions, and is consistent with
unimodality for an appropriate choice of parameters. For example, let H be





9Esteban (1986) deﬁnes this in the context of income distribution as "income share
elasticity": πf is shown to be a legitimate representation of f in that it stands one-to-
one with f itself. It should be noticed that “the Pareto, Gamma and Normal density
functions correspond to constant, linear and quadratic elasticities, respectively” (p.442).
Note also that, if the density takes the form f(x,a), with a some parameter, the condition
πf
a(x,a) > 0 amounts to the MLRP (Benassi and Chirco, 2006).
10As Holmström and Hart (1987, p.81) argue when discussing the possibilty of linear
sharing rules, "the connection between x as physical output and as statistical information
is very tenuous [...]; all that matters is the distribution of the posterior (or likelihood ratio)
as a function of the agent’s action".
11This amounts to the log version of the Jewitt case, as lnψ = x − a.
7where Γ(·,·) is the incomplete Gamma function, with β > 1 and γ > 0.12
One can check that
π




monotonically decreasing and positive for ψ ≤ βγ: letting ψ(x,a) = ex−a one
has
f(x,a;β,γ) =

















which is clearly monotonically increasing in x. Suppose for instance that
(β,γ) = (2,3):13 then unimodality is consistent with this suitably trans-
formed additive structure.
Example 4 In a somewhat similar vein, one can have ψ(x,a) = x/a,14 in









so that, again, for a > 0 any distribution H with positive and decreasing
Esteban elasticity will do.
4 Concluding remarks
The twin conditions of Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property and Convexity
of the Distribution are often claimed to be too stringent for the First Order
12That is, Γ(x,y) =
￿ ∞
x e−tty−1dt, such that Γ(0,y) = Γ(y).
13Clearly, we are imposing ψ = ex−a ∈ [1,4]. The mode is xm = a + ln[(β − 1)γ], such
that exm−a = (β − 1)γ; since πh positive and decreasing requires βγ > 4, the parameter







14This clearly amounts to interpreting Jewitt’s formulation in log terms.
8Approach to the solution of the standard principal-agent problem to be viable
in many applications, as most distributions currently in use do not satisfy
them. In this short note we have shown that this may in fact not be so,
as some convexifying transformations are available which allow one to work
with suitably transformed standard distributions.
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